读书笔记 reading notes
出版年: 2013-1
出版社：社会科学文献出版社
ISBN: 9787509731888
This work is undoubtedly a masterpiece. It is always deeply moving to witness a massive volume of historical materials skillfully organized to elucidate historical truths. The numerous documents and sources provide powerful support for the author’s in-depth arguments regarding Sino-Soviet relations. Professor Shen Zhihua is, without question, a legendary scholar.
If this book merely discussed the historical trajectory of the Sino-Soviet alliance, it would already be excellent. However, the final chapter extends this discussion to the general relations among socialist countries, analyzing their developmental characteristics and causal factors. This elevates the book’s value far beyond “excellent.”
Following the book’s structure, I will now discuss my understanding of the development of Sino-Soviet relations across different historical periods.
During the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Liberation War
Traditional textbook narratives often create the impression that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was consistently guided by Marxism and accepted the leadership of the Communist International (Comintern) at critical moments, seemingly maintaining close ties with the Soviet Union. However, in reality, from the CCP’s inception, it suffered from many errors due to the erroneous command of the Comintern and Stalin. It was only after the Zunyi Conference that the CCP began to establish a leadership centered on Mao, and its relationship with the Comintern grew distant. The subsequent Yan’an Rectification Movement thoroughly consolidated Mao’s leadership. Therefore, prior to the Civil War, the CCP and the Comintern had few dealings. During the War of Resistance, the CCP actually received more aid from the United States.
Towards the end of the War of Resistance, as Japan faced continuous defeats, the Kuomintang (KMT), as China’s sole legitimate government, was courted by both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union was more concerned with whether its interests in the Far East could be guaranteed, especially in the Northeast (Manchuria), regarding the Chinese Eastern Railway and Port Arthur. Consequently, in the final stages of the war, despite both being communist parties, the Soviet attitude toward the CCP was neutral; it even courted Chiang Kai-shek. But as Chiang gradually leaned toward the United States, and the CCP entered into confrontation with the US, the Soviet Union was left with no choice but to support the CCP. Under this trend, Sino-Soviet relations progressively moved toward cooperation. After the outbreak of the Liberation War, the Soviet Union conducted a planned withdrawal of its troops from the Northeast and showed a preference for providing supplies to the CCP.
As the CCP achieved successive victories in the Civil War, Mao Zedong urgently needed Soviet support, as state governance was an entirely new domain for the CCP. The Soviet Union also needed to fully understand China’s new leader, to avoid Mao becoming another Tito. Thus, in early 1949, Anastas Mikoyan, representing the CPSU, secretly visited Xibaipo. During these talks, the Chinese side fully expressed its admiration for the Soviet Union and its willingness to learn and demonstrate loyalty. Mikoyan also expressed his appreciation for Mao Zedong. Following this secret meeting, on July 1, People’s Daily published “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” publicly announcing the “lean to one side” policy. Sino-Soviet relations thus moved toward cooperation.
From the Founding of the PRC to the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU
Although “leaning to one side” signaled the intimacy of Sino-Soviet relations, the two sides did not immediately form an alliance, because Soviet interests in the Northeast had not been definitively secured. After the founding of the PRC, Mao Zedong visited the Soviet Union to negotiate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. The core issues included Port Arthur, the Chinese Eastern Railway, mineral development in Xinjiang, and autonomy for Inner Mongolia. Stalin was naturally unwilling to relinquish his interests in the Far East and thus did not agree to fully restore sovereignty over these areas to China. Mao adopted a firm stance, remaining in the Kremlin for an extended period, leading to external rumors that “Stalin had placed Mao under house arrest.” After negotiations, the Chinese Eastern Railway was ultimately returned to China, and the two sides agreed to jointly develop Xinjiang. Port Arthur, however, remained leased, partly because, aside from Stalin’s reluctance, China lacked naval power at the time and required Soviet support.
In the early days of the PRC, Taiwan became the only region yet to be “liberated.” Facing this challenge, Mao Zedong was eager to complete the liberation of Taiwan. However, lacking a strong naval force, he had to pin his hopes on Soviet military support. Simultaneously, Kim Il-sung was also eager to achieve the unification of Korea. Compared to the impoverished China, Kim Il-sung was even more desperate for Soviet aid. Stalin placed great strategic importance on the Korean Peninsula. After returning Port Arthur to China, if the Soviet Union wished to maintain its access to warm-water ports in the Far East, it had to consolidate its influence in Korea.
In the global context of this period, the Cold War curtain was slowly descending. Stalin was unwilling to directly confront the United States, lest it trigger a global conflict. Therefore, in the face of Kim Il-sung’s repeated requests, Stalin did not give immediate approval. After careful consideration, Kim’s plan for a swift campaign finally received Stalin’s approval in principle, but this still required Mao Zedong’s endorsement. Mao, however, believed that resolving the Taiwan issue was more urgent and thus did not support the plan in principle. Nonetheless, Kim Il-sung, under the pretext of a rapid campaign, launched the war while simultaneously informing Mao.
Kim Il-sung’s initiation of the war immediately enraged the United States, intensifying Cold War tensions. Facing the US counterattack and the successful Incheon landing, Kim’s army suffered successive defeats. In this dire situation of total abandonment, Mao Zedong resolutely decided to send troops in support, using this opportunity to solicit a series of military aid packages from Stalin. (Even without a guarantee of military aid, Mao had already decided to intervene. The decision to send troops was made prior to Stalin’s commitment of aid.) During the Korean War, although the United States was aware of the Soviet Air Force’s participation, both sides maintained silence to avoid escalating the conflict into a global war.
The success of the People’s Volunteer Army in the Korean War held a threefold significance for Mao Zedong:
- As a political “pledge of allegiance,” it successfully demonstrated support and loyalty to the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. In return, Stalin initiated comprehensive aid to China.
- It solidified the socialist camp’s position and greatly boosted its confidence.
- It significantly enhanced Mao Zedong’s influence within the socialist camp, making him a key figure second only to Stalin.
Thereafter, the Soviet Union launched comprehensive aid to China, including the aid projects during the “First Five-Year Plan,” which helped China comprehensively modernize and laid a solid foundation. The significance of Soviet aid to China was immense, extending beyond the completion of the 156 key projects. More importantly, it helped China establish modern state foundations in terms of management, standards, and institutions. This experience, and the savings in trial-and-error costs, was of extraordinary significance for China. Unfortunately, as Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, these nascent industrial systems, including subsequent five-year plans, gradually declined. China failed to continue developing along the industrial foundation established by Soviet aid; in the midst of various political movements, this legacy was gradually depleted, leaving only a partial inheritance of standards and technical personnel.
From the 20th Party Congress to the World Conference of Communist Parties
Stalin died. The leader who had gradually established absolute authority during World War II, incorporated Eastern Europe into the socialist camp, and ruled with an iron fist, finally departed the historical stage. Not only was Khrushchev elated to take the reins of the Soviet Union, but so was Mao. The memory of the treatment Mao had received during his visit to the Soviet Union flooded his mind. Now, with Stalin dead, the figures with the greatest status and prestige in the socialist camp were Mao and the Soviet leadership. But Mao ruled an still-impoverished China, not the Soviet Union. Therefore, Mao urgently needed to develop China’s economy and become a true great power—politically, economically, and militarily.
Thus, Mao actively utilized Marxist theory, seeking to promote the development of productive forces by changing social relations. The People’s Communes and the Great Leap Forward were the results. The People’s Communes and the Great Leap Forward were an attempt to artificially inflate economic levels, with steel production as the most important KPI. Essentially, this differed markedly from the meticulously planned economy implemented by high-level experts in the Soviet Union. The Great Leap Forward, in effect, distorted the essence of a planned economy. Consequently, while the Soviet Union could not endorse this rush for quick results, other countries in Eastern Europe expressed admiration for China’s economic experiments, further enhancing Mao’s status in the socialist camp.
At the 20th Party Congress after Stalin’s death, Khrushchev made his debut as leader. However, when he delivered the “Secret Speech” criticizing Stalin’s cult of personality, the socialist camp was plunged into a deep crisis. On the one hand, social movements opposing Soviet control erupted in Poland and Hungary; the former was defined as a “contradiction among the people,” the latter as a “counter-revolutionary incident.” Mao actively mediated in the Polish and Hungarian incidents, helping to quell the unrest and extending China’s—and his own—influence into Eastern Europe.
On the other hand, the people of the socialist countries, after decades of Stalin worship, suddenly faced criticism of him, and their faith was plunged into crisis. During this process, Mao provided theoretical and public opinion support to Khrushchev, offered a “balanced” (三七开) assessment of Stalin, and after the “June Incident,” helped Khrushchev resolve the challenge from the “Anti-Party Group” (including Molotov). Khrushchev was deeply moved and decided to grant China a major gift: atomic bomb technology.
The CCP, which had long desired nuclear weapons technology but had previously only received a Soviet nuclear umbrella without technical support, finally obtained the technology for an atomic bomb. Mao Zedong decided to accept Khrushchev’s invitation to attend the World Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties in Moscow, positioning himself as a leader of the socialist camp. This conference was organized and led by the Soviet Union, with Mao and the CCP acting as behind-the-scenes planners and spiritual pillars. Sino-Soviet relations thus reached their historical zenith.
The Split After the World Conference
Khrushchev’s secret criticism of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress reflected a fundamental change in the Soviet leadership’s assessment of the global situation. The Stalin era represented leadership, confrontation, and war. Mao’s viewpoint was highly consistent with Stalin’s, perhaps even more extreme: he believed that struggle—including class struggle and contradictions among the people—was universal, that social progress originated from struggle, and that the expansion of the socialist camp also came from struggle, even war. Conversely, Khrushchev and others believed that in the contemporary world situation, socialist parties could peacefully transition to socialism in capitalist countries through parliamentary struggle, elections, and other means. To achieve this, Stalin’s line had to be negated. This negation eventually evolved into an open critique of Stalin.
In reality, although Mao held grievances against Stalin, this dissatisfaction stemmed more from a place of grievance and envy. When Mao had the opportunity to become the spiritual leader of the socialist camp, he adopted an even more absolute line than Stalin. Therefore, he and Khrushchev could fundamentally not reach a consensus on their understanding of the world situation.
Thus, Mao decided to bombard Kinmen (Quemoy), creating a tense global situation. It was only in such a situation of tension that one could better wage struggle and achieve the expansion of the socialist camp through that struggle. This also explains why Mao did not genuinely want to occupy Kinmen, much less “liberate” Taiwan. He still chose to manufacture conflict, even before his naval power was fully prepared, while simultaneously and prudently controlling the scale of the conflict. This led to discussions such as, “Can we shell Kinmen’s command headquarters without harming any Americans?” Khrushchev was extremely displeased by this behavior. While Khrushchev was striving to ease global tensions and seek opportunities for peaceful transition, Mao was constantly creating tension. As Khrushchev made progress and reached agreements with the West on issues like nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, Mao’s actions undoubtedly led Khrushchev to have reservations about the nuclear technology support provided to China, and he delayed the delivery of some technology.
At this time, Mao was brimming with self-confidence. He saw himself as the third great leader after Marx and Lenin, even believing he had surpassed Stalin. Although China’s economic and technical strength was not yet fully developed, he firmly believed that under the guidance of his farsighted socialist theory, seeking development through struggle, he could soon become the true leader of the socialist camp. In Mao’s eyes, the Soviet Union might still have a place, but Khrushchev himself was already eclipsed.
Regarding the 1959 Sino-Indian border conflict, although China held a slight military advantage, the Soviet attitude greatly displeased Mao. In line with Khrushchev’s assessment of the world situation, a peaceful transition to socialism via parliament and elections was the future he envisioned, and Nehru was the key figure the Soviet Union hoped would realize this goal in India. Nehru was facing immense nationalist pressure at home; therefore, the Soviet Union preferred to stop the conflict and exerted pressure on Mao to alleviate Nehru’s burden. However, Mao believed that Khrushchev, as the leader of a fellow socialist country, was favoring Nehru. This made Mao deeply suspicious of Khrushchev, believing he had abandoned his principles and embarked on the path of revisionism.
On September 15, 1959, Khrushchev began his 15-day visit to the United States. The trip was extremely successful, at least in Khrushchev’s view, as he not only promoted large-scale disarmament but also held in-depth talks with Eisenhower, reaching a consensus on a peaceful international environment. Therefore, when Khrushchev concluded his US tour and arrived in Beijing, full of joy, for the 10th anniversary of the PRC, he excitedly shared his achievements in fostering world peace with Mao. However, for Mao, a man who had spent his life pursuing struggle and identifying contradictions, this was undoubtedly a completely contrary path. Consequently, the two sides had a public falling-out at the meeting, and the atmosphere was extremely awkward.
Thus, Sino-Soviet relations completely broke down. The Soviet Union began to withdraw its experts aiding China, eventually leading to the deployment of a million troops on the Sino-Soviet border.
The Dazzling Brilliance of the Final Chapter
The brilliance of the final chapter is dazzling.
Sino-Soviet relations indeed had frictions and conflicts of interest, but within the broader context of the socialist camp, the two countries could have found common ground. However, these frictions and conflicts were ultimately only the superficial phenomena of the Sino-Soviet split, not the fundamental cause.
Different judgments on the trend of world development, different expectations for the future world, and the ideological differences between the two sides became an important factor in the rupture. Yet, even when China and the Soviet Union later reached agreement on certain ideological issues, this consistency failed to prevent the further deterioration of their relations. This demonstrates that ideological differences were not the fundamental cause of the split.
Reviewing the history, the struggle for leadership over the socialist movement and the international communist movement was the direct cause of the rupture. It was precisely because the Soviet Union held absolute leadership that Sino-Soviet relations could develop intimately. When China began to desire dominance, and even gained a degree of it, but did not possess absolute dominance, the relationship ruptured. This was a structural imbalance.
This raises the question: Why did the socialist camp require a single hegemonic power? Why are relations between capitalist countries seemingly more stable? Here, Professor Shen’s analysis is brilliant:
The evolution and outcome of Sino-Soviet relations are not an isolated phenomenon within the socialist camp. One can observe a common phenomenon in the relations between socialist countries: when two countries are on good terms, they are so close that ‘you and I’ become indistinguishable, calling each other brothers, and the noble spirit of proletarian internationalism conceals all differences and contradictions; when two countries are on bad terms, it becomes a life-and-death struggle, to the point of abandoning the basic principles and conventions of international exchange, even resorting to military confrontation.
Clearly, this type of state relationship lacks universally recognized political norms and mechanisms for compromise to constrain mutual behavior. It is either an indistinguishable friend or a mortal enemy.
This situation was by no means unique to Sino-Soviet relations. It existed in Europe between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and in East Asia in China’s relations with Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan.
Socialist countries… often fall into contradiction and confusion. This political paradigm of socialist state relations has innate structural deficiencies, mainly reflected in two aspects:
First, the concept of sovereignty is unclear, manifested as a contradiction between the ideal of internationalism and the pursuit of national or state interests, using ideological uniformity to replace or cover up differences in national interests.
Second, the concept of equality is ill-defined, manifested as a contradiction between the organizational principle of leader-and-led within the alliance and the norm of all countries enjoying equal rights, using the unified leadership of the socialist camp to exclude the equal rights that all allied countries should enjoy.
Nationalism dominates the concept of the nation-state, while communism dominates the concept of the “world citizen” or “brotherhood.” These two are essentially in conflict. Nationalism demands that, among nation-states, one’s own country is the first priority, whereas communism prioritizes “great harmony under heaven” (天下大同). When one nation-state possesses an absolute advantage, it can, of course, promote this “great harmony” (provided, of course, that the path to this harmony is its path, such as Stalin’s line for Eastern Europe or Mao’s line for East and Southeast Asia). But when the relationship between two or more nation-states becomes equal, conflict arises if their paths to “great harmony” are inconsistent. Furthermore, from the perspective of the nation-state, contradictions emerge between states rather than merely between parties.
Professor Shen analyzes the cause of the Sino-Soviet split using a framework of structural imbalance: the leadership structure of the socialist camp became imbalanced, party-to-party relations replaced state-to-state relations, and the pursuit of unity and uniformity, ignoring different internal paths and demands, caused the disintegration of the alliance.
In the end, it really comes down to one sentence: Extreme-left communism is pernicious, and extreme-left nationalism is even more so.