In fact, what surprised me most after finishing this book was the extent to which its arguments are saturated with Foucauldian undertones. For a long time, I felt that Foucault’s grand discourses were not particularly closely linked to the philosophy of technology, though one could certainly view the Panopticon as a means of technical management, or his discourse on technical language as being fraught with power relations. However, Gabrielle Hecht’s brilliant analysis in this book transcends such simple applications; it is deeply embedded in the very construction of “technopolitics.”
The regimes established by the CEA (Commissariat à l’énergie atomique) and EDF (Électricité de France) encompass not only nuclear reactors but also political discourses regarding “French independence,” mathematical models of economic rationality, and even the aesthetic architecture of the power plants themselves. Professor Hecht demonstrates how these regimes produce specific power effects through what Foucault describes as a “dispositif” (apparatus).
Foucault’s focus on “Gouvernementalité” (governmentality) is also strongly reflected here. The French government sought to redefine its return to “Great Power” status through the mastery of nuclear technology, utilizing it as a vehicle for national resurgence. This aligns perfectly with Foucault’s assertion that the state enhances its own power and maintains order through complex systems of apparatuses.
Furthermore, the dispute over reactor technical paths (UNGG vs. PWR) was never a simple debate over scientific truth, but rather a contest between different regimes of power, a point where the Foucauldian influence is most palpable.
Beyond Foucault, Hecht’s dialogue with Thomas Hughes and Bruno Latour permeates the entire book. The concept of “Momentum” or inertia inherent in Large Technological Systems (LTS) suggests that once a system is established, it proceeds along a trajectory that is difficult to alter. The nuclear power system perfectly exemplifies such an LTS, incorporating not just technical components, but also the political system, including uranium resources, foreign policy, and national budgets. Crucially, Hecht argues that this LTS produced not only a vast and complex operational system but also a modern “French identity” rooted in national pride. Within this system lie deep-seated power oppressions and struggles for political discourse.
The Transition from Graphite-Gas to Pressurized Water Reactors
The Graphite-Gas Reactor (UNGG) was led by the CEA. Its core advantage was the use of natural uranium, meaning France did not have to rely on American enrichment technology, thereby achieving energy sovereignty and diplomatic independence. Additionally, this design was more conducive to producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. For CEA engineers, UNGG was a symbol of “French originality,” directly linked to the national “Radiance” (Grandeur) under Gaullism. Furthermore, France had accumulated significant long-term technical expertise in UNGG, which provided substantial political momentum.
The Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) was increasingly favored by EDF. Based on Westinghouse (US) patents and using enriched uranium, it was considered less “politically pure.” However, EDF engineers viewed it as economically more efficient, technically more mature, and better suited for large-scale commercial power generation, a tool embodying a modernized regime.
Consequently, a struggle, rather than a mere debate, ensued between the CEA and EDF over the developmental path of French nuclear power. While EDF initially had to accept the CEA’s natural uranium path, it incrementally introduced the logic of “economic rationality” during the management of the Chinon plant. Economic rationality served as a pragmatic logic; by introducing this discourse, they could redefine what was “critical” and “important.” Simultaneously, UNGG technology faced severe engineering challenges as it scaled up. The 1969 partial core melt at the Saint-Laurent plant dealt a heavy blow to the graphite-gas camp. Moreover, as the global market shifted toward PWR, the export advantages of UNGG evaporated.
The shift in the political landscape in 1969 became the final turning point. President de Gaulle resigned; as the staunchest political protector of the UNGG route, his departure deprived the CEA of its highest-level discursive support. The new President, Georges Pompidou, leaned more toward industrial competitiveness and efficiency. Following an investigation by a special governmental commission, France officially abandoned the UNGG route in favor of the US-licensed PWR technology.
However, the transition to PWR was an active process of “Frenchification.” By acquiring technical licenses and establishing a complete domestic supply chain (e.g., the rise of Framatome), France reclaimed the PWR as “French.” The 1973 oil crisis and the “Messmer Plan” accelerated this transition, leading to the large-scale deployment of standardized PWRs and resulting in the nuclear-heavy energy landscape of France today.
The Myth of PWR’s “Inherent Superiority”?
The PWR relies on enriched uranium, requiring a complex and expensive enrichment system. However, this fuel allows for smaller reactors, smaller pressure vessels, and cheaper civil engineering costs, forming the basis of its “economic rationality” narrative. The US led this path because the PWR had already matured through their nuclear submarine program, possessing a complete industrial supply chain.
Conversely, the UNGG uses raw uranium ore, which requires no complex processing and produces plutonium for weapons, facilitating France’s independent nuclear deterrent. However, the lower initial fuel costs resulted in massive reactors, larger pressure vessels, and more expensive construction, with inherent power limitations.
In reality, the “true cost” of either path is quite difficult to calculate, an embodiment of Thomas Hughes’s “Seamless Web.” As construction scales, actual marginal costs are difficult to estimate, and the subsequent addition of safety features also drove up the actual costs of PWR. Thus, the discourse of economic rationality was a tool, a weapon for seizing discursive power, rather than a reflection of simple technical superiority.
Furthermore, considerations of nuclear non-proliferation played a role. Because PWRs require enriched uranium, the materials and processing equipment are highly complex, providing a “hook” for international monitoring. The de Gaulle government’s insistence on UNGG was driven by the ability to use cheap uranium from colonies, bypassing US-led monitoring of nuclear fuel to achieve a kind of “national autonomy.” This path reflected the Gaullist attempt to maintain independence amidst the US-USSR hegemony.
From Imported PWR to a New French Reinvention
Adopting the US-led PWR was a “pragmatic” choice, a result of multi-party game theory pushed primarily by EDF. With the exploding demand for electricity, EDF needed a technology capable of rapid growth. EDF successfully transformed nuclear power from a diplomatic and military symbol into an industrial and civilian commodity.
The “economic rationality” introduced by EDF became the primary factor for comparison. Through various packaging techniques, the PWR path was made to appear cheaper and more efficient. President Pompidou pivoted from de Gaulle’s view of nuclear power as a weapon against hegemony to a more pragmatic stance, accepting US technology as a Western ally to drive France toward energy modernization. By 1973, the “American threat” was superseded by the energy threat from Arab nations. Consequently, France imported the PWR, indigenized the technology, promoted the uranium enrichment chain, and ultimately became a global nuclear superpower.
The Agency of Technocrats
In this book, I found a perfect comparative subject for my own research. Technocrats played a vital role in this transformation. They translated abstract political goals:independence, the restoration of Grandeur, into specific technical specifications (e.g., natural uranium cycles, UNGG design). They were not just experts who understood technology, but also politicians who understood the machinery of bureaucracy. They used professional knowledge as a shield to secure extraordinary autonomy in political decision-making.
While the CEA, as a government arm, believed only original French technology could represent the nation and resist hegemony, they were thwarted by EDF’s role as the “economic rationalist.” Yet, any complex system, like nationalism itself, possesses “Momentum” and strong public support. To reshape the nationalist narrative, EDF rebranded the PWR as a pillar of national strength. They packaged the aesthetics of nuclear plants as a “spectacle”, the “castles of the 20th century.” Crucially, supporting the PWR path was framed as shaping a modern French identity.
Conclusion
France’s nuclear industry is exceptionally advanced and was the primary technology provider for China’s first nuclear plant (Daya Bay). Daya Bay is located in my city; I once drove there attempting to visit. However, in China, any nuclear plant is a vital military-grade unit, not open to the public. I had heard that before COVID-19, they opened for one day a year, but this seems to have ceased.
I have long observed the development of China’s energy system and even invested in the energy industry. Yet, its complexity far exceeds general public awareness. My interest in nuclear technology began with a debate competition in my undergraduate years, where my team argued against China’s development of nuclear power. That experience led to over a decade of observation.
From UHV (Ultra-High Voltage) transmission to supercritical coal-fired units and recent supercritical CO2 power generation, China’s energy industry has seen immense growth. I have personally experienced, and at one point participated in, the construction of these nationalist narratives.
Therefore, I can sense the “elite perspective” reflected in Hecht’s book, perhaps a reflection of a helpless reality. The complexity of energy systems has gradually deprived the public of the possibility of discussion. But isn’t this the role of the public intellectual? Our task is to enable more people to participate in these discussions, allowing ordinary citizens to have a say in the decision-making paths of “high” technology.
Additionally, the book’s discussion of national identity might be somewhat singular. Even within the same “national identity,” the perceptions of different identities can vary vastly. Furthermore, while I noted that calculating the costs of UNGG vs. PWR is difficult, the book could have gone further in its economic analysis. Even if precision is impossible, providing a range or a sophisticated estimate would have been valuable.